As regards the second point, one of the peculiarities of the distinction is that it frustrates the normal justifications of the rules, namely to treat a category of cases in a certain way despite the individual differences between them, which leads to a gain in predictability and transparency in the decision-making process. Instead, the subsequent court is free to avoid the result indicated by the previous relationship, as long as it can find a factual difference between the two cases that limits the previous relationship, while supporting the result in the earlier case. Moreover, this power is conferred not only on courts with the same level of authority as the one setting the precedent (as is the case for the annulment of the decision), but on any court in the judicial hierarchy. Thus, in England, the Court of Appeal cannot overturn a decision of the House of Lords (and not even its own decisions normally), but it is free to distinguish a decision of the House of Lords, even if the case before it falls within the decision of the House of Lords. Thus, from the perspective of jurisprudence, the courts below have the power to restrict the rules made by the higher courts as long as the narrower rule still supports the result achieved in the earlier case. It is not clear why subordinate courts should have the power to restrict the decisions of higher courts in this particularly limited manner. The answer is yes, without addressing the question whether the Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in finding that tyres had lost their import status. In any event, we consider that Georgia`s assessment of a non-discriminatory property tax on imported tyres does not fall within the constitutional prohibition on imposing „levies or duties on imports … “ to the extent that Low v. Austin. On the contrary, that decision is annulled. This list does not contain overturned precedents concerning questions of legal interpretation, interpretation of state law, common law, or judicial rules of procedure or evidence. It does not include outvoted cases that have been reviewed by Congress, such as cases where state laws have been upheld or struck down for violating the trade term, because the Supreme Court treats precedents that Congress might alter by enacting laws as statutory matters for stare decisis purposes.

See South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, No. 17-494, Slip op. cit. at 2 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., different) („The bar [for departing from stare decisis and reversing precedents] is even higher in areas where Congress „exercises primary authority“ and can overturn decisions of this court by legislation to the contrary.“) (Citations omitted). The doctrine of stare decisis in American jurisprudence has its roots in 18th century English common law. In 1765, English jurist William Blackstone described the doctrine of English common law as a strong presumption that judges would „respect previous precedents in which the same points recur in litigation“ unless those precedents were „merely absurd or unjust“ to promote the stability of the law.33 And the creators of the Constitution of the United States, that gave the Supreme Court and lower federal courts the „judicial power“ of the United States, Blackstone repeated in his writings in the late 18th century, favoring judges` respect for judicial precedents because it limited judges` discretion to interpret ambiguous provisions of written law. For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist during the debates on the adoption of the Constitution in the late 18th century. In an essay in which he addressed concerns about the judiciary, courts should apply precedents to prevent judges from having unlimited discretion in interpreting ambiguous legal texts.34 Historical sources, however, provide only limited insight into the founders` views on stare decisis.

and it is not clear whether Hamilton was referring to the presumption that a court should uphold its own previous decisions, or rather those of the superior courts.35 Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., different) („Countless judicial decisions and legislative decrees have been based on the old thesis that the belief of a ruling majority that certain sexual conduct is „immoral and unacceptable.“ is a rational basis for regulation. It should be noted that modern common law advocates a particularly strong version of stare decisis, which requires subsequent courts to follow previous decisions, even if those cases were wrongly decided under pre-existing law. It is often assumed by ordinary jurists that a doctrine of stare decisis necessarily requires that subsequent courts be bound by such erroneous decisions. This follows from the following school of thought. If subsequent courts were not obliged to follow erroneous decisions, they would only be „bound“ by previous and correct judgments. But an earlier correct judgment simply concludes that the law was already supported when it was enacted. Thus, ordering the courts to follow up cases that were not flawed would simply mean ordering them to do what they are legally required to do anyway (i.e. the application of the law), making the doctrine of precedent superfluous.

The flaw in this reasoning lies in the assumption that, in each case, there must be only one legally correct result, while other results are wrong. This ignores the possibility of cases where the substance of the dispute is legally uncertain, so there is more than one possible outcome that would not be bad. The assertion that a case is „legally indefinite“ includes a number of situations, such as the merits of opposing arguments, which are legally the same, or where conflicting considerations cannot be rationally compared to each other. In such cases, the decision amends the law without making mistakes. The common law could then have qualified its doctrine of stare decisis by concluding that subsequent courts were not bound by earlier decisions that had been wrongly decided. [2] Instead, it has developed a different practice – that of „layering,“ in which some courts have been given limited power to revoke previous decisions from their binding status because they were poorly decided. Thus, the common law version of the case law does not necessarily flow from the fact that precedents have practical authority. Nevertheless, the idea of having to follow even bad decisions is a common feature of many institutions and will be the focus of this article. The foregoing arguments and analogies are two central forms of reasoning found in many legal systems, particularly common law systems such as those of England and the United States.

A precedent means that a previous decision is followed in a later case because the two cases are the same. The analogy implies that an earlier decision is followed in a later case because the subsequent case is similar to the previous one. The main philosophical problems raised by precedents and analogies are: 1) When are two cases „equal“ for the purposes of case law? 2. When are two cases „similar“ for the purposes of the analogy? and (3) In both cases, why should the decision in the previous case affect the decision in the subsequent case? (3) Even if it is possible to characterize the „essential“ facts, this does not eliminate the distinction. Take, for example, a subsequent trust case in which the beneficiary paid nothing for the trust, but acted adversely by relying on the receipt. The beneficiary is still a „volunteer“ who has not transferred anything to the trustee for the property, but the receipt has been relied upon. That may well lead to a subsequent court distinguishing the earlier case, even if the facts are otherwise identical to those in the main proceedings. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the precedent is binding only if (a) the „essential facts“ are present and (b) there are no other relevant facts, it is no longer a „rules-based“ presentation of a precedent – this only reinforces the minimum requirement that the decision in the subsequent case must not conflict with the outcome of the precedent.

An obvious way to avoid this problem would be to ask how the previous court would have assessed the facts in a later case. But while this would be satisfactory in theory (although sometimes difficult in practice), it also does not reflect legal practice. The courts sometimes approach the issue that way, but often they do not, and there is no legal obligation to do so. A better answer is that the fundamental requirement of the common law in stare decisis is to treat previous cases as having been appropriately disposed of. A case may be distinguished, but only if this distinction does not imply that the precedent was badly decided. In the latter case, the court must therefore decide whether the factual difference (real property and personal property, tacit or express trust) better justifies the previous decision than the facts of the case alone. If this is the case, the court can distinguish (citing these differences from the original case), as this does not mean that the precedent was wrong.