On the other hand, the term „administrative“ in the phrase „report, hearing, audit, or investigation of Congress, the Administration, or the Government Accounting Office [sic]“ has been expanded beyond federal administrative units to include the work of government agencies.67 Similarly, the term „report“ in the same wording has been interpreted broadly to include raw copies of the contractor`s documents. Freedom of Information Act: Placing the „report“ on a list that included „hearings, audits, and investigations“ did not, as the Second Circuit concluded, limit „reports“ to documents that also analyzed, synthesized, or explained the information presented.68 As with other canons of language, noscitur a sociis can be a factor of interpretation. but is „by no means a fixed rule…“69 Friedrich v. Stadt Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1989). Justice Posner calls „unrealistic“ the assumption on which the canon is based, namely that Congress examines and imagines all legislation before legislating: How could Congress do this, he wondered, „given the enormous scope of laws that have never been repealed and the even greater expansion of judicial and administrative decisions. which ignore this legislation“. Concerning the Doctors` Hospital of Hyde Park, 337 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir. 2003).

On the positive side, the rule serves the „paramount values of harmonizing different statutes and limiting judicial discretion in interpreting statutes.“ Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass`n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991). However, the fact that a word is defined by law does not necessarily mean that other forms of the word are related by the definition. Therefore, a legal definition of „person“ that includes businesses did not regulate whether „personal“ privacy under the law included businesses and not just individuals: „In common usage, a noun and its adjective form can have meanings as different as two unrelated words.“ F.C.C. v. AT&T, 562 U.S. ___, No. 09-1279, op. cit. to 5 (March 1, 2011) (using the example of „Crab“ and „Crab“). It might be questioned whether taking into account the abilities and limitations of agents falls within the scope of legal interpretation theory.

It may be, for example, that the right place to examine bias and judges` limitations is the theory of jurisprudence. Let us leave aside this largely terminological question. Instead, in the theory of legal interpretation, we can distinguish different degrees and types of idealization. For example, a highly idealized type of theory asks how a legal interpreter, without cognitive or temporal constraints, best determines what the law obtains as legally and morally admissible evidence (without regard to values other than accuracy, except for limiting it to admissible evidence). A somewhat less idealized type of theory asks how agents with specific abilities and limitations would be best able to accurately identify the contributions of dispositions under real-world conditions, including a limited amount of time. Finally, we might ask how a legal interpreter should proceed, taking into account not only accuracy, but also the values presented above, such as promoting good writing. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the court considered three provisions of the law on the treatment of prisoners. In two of these provisions, Congress immediately restricted access to the courts for individuals in certain pending military cases, but the third provision did not explicitly restrict access to courts for individuals in proceedings pending through habeas corpus petitions. The court said Congress passed its final wording only after rejecting versions that would have immediately limited habeas relief in ongoing cases: „Congress` rejection of the very language that would have produced the result the administration is seeking here weighs heavily against the administration`s interpretation.“ 548 U.S.

557, 579-80 (2006). Thus, the examples given by textualists concerning the interpretation of ordinary communication and its use of certain canons of interpretation suggest that the relevant investigation is what it would be reasonable to understand the speaker in order to communicate. In fact, textualists often claim that what words mean is what a reasonable person wants to understand or convey through the speaker – thus confusing the meaning of words with reasonable inferences about communicative intent (e.g., Scalia and Garner 2012, 16, 56). Similarly, textualists often refer to the relevant investigation as an „objective legal intent,“ understood as what a reasonable person would have wanted from Parliament given the context. [29] Congress sometimes attempts to emphasize the primacy of a legislative directive by stating that it applies „notwithstanding the provisions of“ another specified law or class of laws. The courts take into account this express intention to override the provisions mentioned in a clause „nevertheless“,263 but where the clause purports to prevail over „any other provision of the law“, its scope of exclusion is often unclear.