The concept of istislah in Islamic law has some similarities with the tradition of natural law in the West, as illustrated by Thomas Aquinas. However, while natural law does consider what is obviously good, since it tends to satisfy the person, istislah generally calls good what is related to one in five „basic goods“. Many jurists, theologians and philosophers have attempted to abstract these „fundamental and fundamental goods“ from legal rules. Al-Ghazali, for example, defined it as religion, life, reason, descent and property, while others also add „honor.“ John Finnis understands himself to explain and develop the views of Thomas Aquinas and Blackstone. Like Bix, Finnis believes that the naturalism of Thomas Aquinas and Schwarzstein should not be interpreted as a conceptual representation of the conditions of existence of the law. According to Finnis, classical naturalists were not concerned with giving a conceptual representation of legal validity; rather, they were concerned with explaining the moral force of law: „The principles of natural law explain the binding force (in the fullest sense of `obligation`) of positive laws, even if these laws cannot be derived from these principles“ (Finnis 1980, 23-24). According to Finnis on the overlap thesis, the essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion (a view he shares with Ronald Dworkin). Accordingly, an unjust law may be valid, but it cannot provide sufficient justification for the use of the coercive power of the State and is therefore not fully mandatory; Thus, an unjust law does not realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law. From this point of view, an unjust law is legally binding, but not completely. Although the core of classical and traditional theory of natural law is therefore not tainted by a „naturalistic error“ (Finnis 2018, 2.4.2), the non-practical knowledge of the facts in this theory counts in different ways. Knowing the factual possibility of acquiring (say) knowledge or losing or saving lives is a date (not really a premise) to understand that such a possibility is also an opportunity – that the realization of this possibility would be good for oneself and for others.

Other relevant types of facts include facts about certain human radical abilities and their absence in other animals – these facts are the data for understanding the meaning and limits of the class (persons, persons) of „others“ to „good for oneself and for others“. Or, facts about the limited supply of resources and the limited strength of human will (the need for incentives, etc.) 1.5° the appropriation of resources to certain owners as a normal demand of justice towards non-owners and owners. But Thomas Aquinas is also a theorist of natural law. According to him, a human law (that is, what is proclaimed by men) is valid only to the extent that its content corresponds to the content of the natural law; As Thomas Aquinas says, „Human law has as much of the nature of law as natural law. But if it departs from the natural law in any respect, it is no longer a law, but a perversion of the law“ (ST. I-II, Q.95, A.II). To paraphrase Augustine`s famous remark, an unjust law is really not a law at all. Natural law theory is defined as an ethical framework that discovers and describes natural laws defined as objective and universal laws of morality that guide human nature. Natural law is primarily concerned with the relationship between morality and the legality of people`s actions and behaviors within a society. Positive law theory describes laws created by an authority figure or authority such as a government or ruler.

Positive laws are man-made laws designed to allow justice in a legal system and support natural laws, but do not always do so. Legal positivism is seen in some ways as an opposition to natural law because it asserts that positive laws are a social construct that replaces natural law, even if positive law is unjust or immoral under natural law. Again, how do questions as fundamental as „Should we be right?“ through the positivist thesis „take shape“ that the existence and content of the law depend only on social facts? Doesn`t Green`s assertion reverse the rational order of inquiry and reflection? Basic human needs and circumstances suggest to people, virtually at all times and in all places, that they should establish and maintain certain norms of the kind we call law, norms that depend directly and largely on social facts such as custom, authoritative rule-making, and jurisprudence. Legal philosophy critically traces and clarifies this elementary practical reasoning, just as Hart did in Hart 1961, where he constructs a descriptive-explanatory representation of law (i.e. being and refining our concept or understanding of law) by explaining how rules differ from habits, how powers have different functions, and a social value of obligations. and are therefore not suitably reducible to obligations (and therefore why rules conferring powers differ from mandatory rules). and how „primary“ rules to prohibit blatant violence, theft and fraud should be complemented by „secondary“ rules of recognition, justice and change because of their substantial and enforceable uncertainty and immobility, the healing complement that brings a society into the realm, the rule of law and the legal system.